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INTRODUCTION
In December of 2018, then-Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan
released a report finding that 690 Catholic priests in Illinois had been
accused of sexual misconduct.1 This scathing report was in direct contrast
* The authors are all associates at the law offices of Cooney & Conway in Chicago, Illinois.
1. See ILL. ATTORNEY GEN.’S OFFICE, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO
CATHOLIC CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS IN ILLINOIS 5 (2018) [hereinafter AG
PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS],
available
at
http://www.bishop-accountability.org/
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to the findings of the Catholic Church in Illinois, which had previously
disclosed only 140 clergy members of having been “credibly” accused of
child sexual abuse prior to Attorney General Madigan’s report.2 In
response to this report, the Church added an additional 45 clergy
members to their list of “credibly accused” abusers bringing the total to
185.3 There are still hundreds of additional clergy members who have not
been thoroughly investigated by the Church that Madigan’s office had
uncovered as accused child sexual abusers. “By choosing not to
thoroughly investigate allegations, the Catholic Church has failed in its
moral obligation to provide survivors, parishioners and the public a
complete and accurate accounting of all sexually inappropriate behavior
involving priests in Illinois,” Madigan said when announcing her
findings.4 “The failure to investigate also means that the Catholic Church
has never made an effort to determine whether the conduct of the accused
priests was ignored or covered up by superiors.”5
When these findings were announced, Cardinal Blasé Cupich of the
Archdiocese of Chicago expressed “the profound regret of the whole
church for our failures to address the scourge of clerical sexual abuse.”6
Cardinal Cupich highlighted that the Archdiocese of Chicago had been
looking into complaints of child sexual abuse by its clergy members since
1991 when then-Cardinal Joseph Bernardin formed a special
commission.7 However, Madigan’s Office found major flaws in how the
Catholic Church handled these accusations. Of all the accusations against
clergy members, the Church’s own investigation found only 26 percent
credible, meaning that 74 percent of accusations were either not

reports/2018_12_19_IL_AG_Preliminary_Findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD2K-2826] (stating
that the Illinois Diocese only publicly reported 185 clergy, even though it had received allegations
for more than five-hundred clergy members, which was not disclosed to the public).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Press Release, Lisa Madigan, Preliminary Findings Show Illinois Dioceses Have Received
at Least 500 Allegations of Clergy Sexual Assault & Abuse Against Children the Church has Never
Made Public (Dec. 19, 2018), available at http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/
pressroom/2018_12/20181219.html [https://perma.cc/48ST-3EEQ].
5. Id.
6. Cardinal Blasé J. Cupich, Statement of the Archdiocese of Chicago on the Attorney General
of Illinois Report on Clergy Sexual Abuse (Dec. 19, 2019); see also Laurie Goodstein & Monica
Davey, Catholic Church in Illinois Withheld Names of at Least 500 Priests Accused of Abuse,
Attorney General Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/
illinois-attorney-general-catholic-church-priest-abuse.html
[https://perma.cc/85MT-A4SN]
(noting that claims were more frequently found to be unsubstantiated or not credible when there
was only one victim, when the clergy member was a member of an order, or when the clergy
member was deceased or reassigned).
7. See Cupich, supra note 6 (noting that the initiatives started by Cardinal Joseph Bernardin
continue in the Archdiocese of Chicago Protection of Children and Youth).
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investigated or not believed.8 The diocese would not investigate if the
accused clergy member was either deceased or no longer with the
ministry, even if multiple persons had levied accusations against that
clergy member.9 The diocese refused to investigate accusations against
priests who were members of a particular order—it would simply hand
the investigation over to the order from which that priest came, even
though the order priest would be ministering with the authority of the
bishop.10 The Church also refused to investigate when victims wanted to
remain anonymous, when a lawsuit was filed, or when a criminal
investigation was opened.11
The Attorney General’s report highlighted the insufficient
transparency of the Church’s procedure, noting its failure to publish the
name of every “credibly accused” sexual abuser.12 Finally, the report also
condemned the “flawed processes and practices,” including failures to
notify law enforcement or DCFS of accusations of abuse and a failure to
determine whether any local archdiocese had engaged in a pattern of
cover-ups.13 As a whole, Madigan’s report concluded that the Church had
failed in achieving “the healing and reconciliation of survivors” and that
it “will not resolve the clergy sexual abuse crisis on their own.”14
In 2013, the Illinois legislature abolished the statutes of limitations on
all suits for damages arising from childhood sexual abuse—but only for
claims that were not previously time-barred.15 S.B. 1399 went into effect
on January 1, 2014, allowing victims with then-eligible claims for
childhood sexual abuse to bring a civil suit against persons and/or private
and public entities.16 It passed unanimously through both houses and was
soon thereafter signed by then-Governor Patrick Quinn.17 The glaring
hole in this legislation, however, is its failure to allow for retroactive
application of the statute to revive time-barred claims.18 The effect this
has is both arbitrary and enormous. Based on a grouping of amendments
and enactments of the statutes of limitations and repose in the 1990s and

8. See AG PRELIMINARY FINDINGS, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that there were “dozens” of
instances where the dioceses failed to adequately investigate allegations).
9. Id. at 6.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id. at 7–8.
14. Id. at 10.
15. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/13−202.2(f) (2020) (“[T]he changes made by this amendatory
Act . . . apply to actions commenced on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the
98th General Assembly if the action would not have been time barred . . . .”).
16. See P.A. 98-276, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014).
17. H.R. JOURNAL, 98TH GEN. ASSEMB., 2013 REG. SESS. NO. 55, at 25 (Ill. 2013).
18. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202.2(f) (2020).
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early 2000s, the statutes of limitations in Illinois apply seemingly at
random to different victims. This result could not have been the intended
effect of the legislature, and it leaves many victims barred from court.
This bar to retroactive application followed consistent holdings by
Illinois courts that the legislature cannot revive time-barred claims by
retroactive application of expanded statutes of limitations.19 The Illinois
Supreme Court arrived at this holding in 1885, basing its opinion off of
the dissent by the United States Supreme Court.20 This Article will take
the position that this line of precedent is founded in a flawed perspective
and that retroactive application of expanded statutes of limitations is
constitutional under the Illinois Constitution. Through an examination of
precedent and comparison of other state legislation and case law, this
paper will show that common sense principles of justice dictate that
withholding claims from victims of childhood sexual abuse in light of the
various legislative amendments makes little sense. This Article will
culminate in a proposal to the legislature to issue a legislative amendment
to its civil statute of limitations, which applies only to certain victims,
which would allow for retroactive-revival of these certain victims’
claims.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Illinois State Law
The Illinois legislature has demonstrated a concerted and consistent
effort at opening the courthouse doors to victims of childhood sexual
abuse. The civil statute was first amended in 1991 and amendments
persisted through 2014,21 even later when considering the criminal
statute.22 The civil limitations statute that currently governs civil child
19. See, e.g., Doe A. v. Diocese of Dall. (Diocese of Dall. II), 917 N.E.2d 475, 477, 486 (Ill.
2009) (affirming the circuit court’s dismissal of the claim because the amendment to the statute of
limitations does not apply retroactively); see also M.E.H. v. L.H., 685 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ill. 1997)
(upholding the lower court’s dismissal of a claim based on child sexual abuse because the statute
of repose, which was repealed prior to the filing of the lawsuit, barred the claim); Bd. of Educ. v.
Blodgett, 40 N.E. 1025, 1025–26, 1028 (Ill. 1895), superseded by statute as stated in Sepmeyer v.
Holman, 615 N.E.2d 1387, 1390 (Ill. App. 1993).
20. See Blodgett, 40 N.E. at 1027 (citing to Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 630 (1885)
(Bradley, J., dissenting)) (noting that the case relied upon in the lower courts was a split decision
where the weight of the authority rested in the dissent).
21. See P.A. 86-1346, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1991) (two year statute of limitation); see also P.A. 88127, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 1994) (same); P.A. 93-0356, § 15 (eff. July 24, 2003) (extending the statute of
limitations to ten years); P.A. 96-1093, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (extending the statute of limitations
to twenty years); P.A. 96-1551, Art. 2, § 1085 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (same); P.A. 98-276, § 5 (eff. Jan.
1, 2014) (abolishing statute of limitations for all future claims).
22. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6(j)(1) (2020); see also P.A. 100-80, § 5 (eff. Aug. 11, 2017)
(extending the statute of limitations for criminal prosecutions when, for example, the victim is a
minor or person with legal disability or when the proper person discovers the abuse).
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sex abuse cases in Illinois is codified at 735 ILCS § 5/13-202.2(b), which
states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action for damages for
personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must be commenced
within twenty years of the date the limitation period begins to run under
subsection (d) or within twenty years of the date the person abused
discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover
both (i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the
injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. The fact that the
person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence
should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not,
by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection
(b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury
or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the
abuse.23

Under this statute, the limitations period does not begin to run until the
minor reaches the age of majority.24 The limitations period is also tolled
where the victim of childhood sexual abuse is being threatened,
manipulated, or defrauded from bringing a claim whether it is by the
abuser or any person acting in the abuser’s interest.25 This subparagraph
of section 202.2 became effective in January 2011.26
However, in 2014, the 98th General Assembly added another
subsection to Section 202.2, reading in pertinent part that “an action for
damages based on childhood sexual abuse may be commenced at any
time.”27 The legislature made a historic leap in totally abolishing the
statutes of limitations on childhood sexual assault, granting an unimpeded
avenue for relief to all victims of future abuse. The greatest shortcoming
of this amendment, however, immediately followed this opening line,
when the legislature curtailed it to apply only to those actions that “would
not have been time barred under any statute of limitations or statute of
repose prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act.”28 Two specific
groupings of amendments to this statute over the last thirty years
demonstrate the devastating effect of this limitation, the first group
consisting of amendments in 1991 and 1994, and the next group in 2003
and 2011.
The first major amendment to the civil statute came in 1991, when the
Illinois General Assembly passed and applied a twelve-year period of
repose to victims seeking to bring civil claims relating to childhood
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202.2(b).
Id. § 13-202.2(d).
Id. § 13-202.2(d-1).
P.A. 96-1093, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).
§ 13-202.2(f); P.A. 98-276, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014).
§ 13-202.2(f).
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sexual abuse.29 At the time, the statute of limitations required that victims
bring suit within two years of the date of discovery of abuse.30 Neither
the statute of limitations nor the statute of repose began to run until the
victim turned eighteen.31 This repose period did not remain in effect for
very long, however, as the legislature eliminated it just three years later,
effective January 1, 1994.32 The legislature clearly understood that such
a period of repose was a mistake—barring claims unnecessarily and
adversely to public policy. However, the Illinois Supreme Court held in
M.E.H. v. L.H. that, regardless of the repose period’s short-lived
enactment, the legislature could not take the statutorily-endowed defense
away from defendants whose victims had turned thirty by the end of
1993.33 This effectively armed anyone who committed sexual abuse
against a minor in the early 1960s with a foolproof defense, and protected
some defendants, based on the age of their victims, that committed child
sex abuse as late as 1981. In practice, however, because of the two-year
statutory limitations period, most defendants would have a foolproof
argument upon their victim turning twenty years old.
The next major amendment came into effect on July 24, 2003, when
the legislature expanded the two-year statute of limitations period to ten
years.34 This again acted only prospectively, however, and meant that
victims who were abused as children, but turned twenty by July 23, 2003,
would be totally barred from bringing claims. Those victims would be in
their early forties and older today. The key to understanding this
legislative framework is to keep in mind that the courts have held that if
a claim is expired, then it cannot be revived.35 Therefore, if a legislative
amendment expands the statute of limitations, only plaintiffs with claims
that are still valid at the time of the amendment’s effect will be captured
by it. This is particularly important to understand when viewing the 2011
legislative amendment, in which the legislature expanded the limitation
period from ten years to twenty years.36 Logistically, this kept then-valid
claims alive for an additional ten years, which then extended to the 2013
amendment that eliminated the statute all together. In simple terms, a
valid claim as of the amendment of 2011 was no longer subject to any
statute of limitations and a suit could be brought at any time.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

P.A. 86-1346, § 1 (eff. 1991).
See id.; see also infra Section II(b) (clarifying the discovery rule).
P.A. 86-1346, § 1.
P.A. 88-127, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 1994).
See generally M.E.H. v. L.H., 685 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. 1997).
P.A. 93-356, § 15 (eff. Jul. 24, 2003).
See generally M.E.H., 685 N.E.2d 335.
P.A. 96-1093 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).
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As certain as those claims may be, the inability to apply the Act
retroactively creates an unusual outcome for certain victims of sexual
abuse and acts arbitrarily in who it will and will not cover. Effectively,
middle-aged and older adults will have a difficult time bringing a lawsuit
unless their case falls within some exception to the statute of limitations.
Specifically, if you were sexually abused as a child and born on or before
July 23, 1983, then you are automatically barred from bringing a claim
under the second group of major amendments in 2003 and 2011.37
Conversely, if you were sexually abused as a child and born on or after
July 24, 1983, then you are not subject to any statute of limitations and
can bring suit whenever you want.38
While the trend in Illinois is moving towards keeping the courts open
to victims of sexual abuse, the fact that statutory amendments cannot be
applied retroactively to expired claims is troubling for certain classes of
people. It is specifically troubling for victims of sexual abuse from the
1960s–1980s, many of whom suffered heinous and well-documented
abuse,39 as well as those who were born on prior to July 24, 1983. The
only avenues of relief in court for these victims rest in two codified
exceptions to the statutes of limitations and repose: the discovery rule and
fraudulent concealment.

37. Since the 2003 amendment went into effect on July 24, 2003, a victim was previously
subject to the two-year statute of limitations, which would have expired for victims that turned
twenty on or before July 23, 2003.
38. It follows from the preceding footnote that all victims who turn twenty after July 23, 2003,
will be covered by the expanded statute of limitations—giving them an extra eight years to bring
suit. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. This means that if you turned twenty on July 24,
2003, your claim would last until July 24, 2011. See P.A. 93-356, § 15 (eff. Jul. 24, 2003) (stating
that the ten-year statute of limitations begins running when a victim turns eighteen). However, the
next amendment raised the statute of limitations to twenty years and went into effect on January 1,
2011, followed by the elimination of the statute of limitations in 2014. See P.A. 96-1093, § 5 (eff.
Jan. 1, 2011) (“[A]n action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must
be commenced within 20 years . . . .”); P.A. 98-276, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (“[A]n action for
damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse may be commenced at any
time . . . .”). This means that if your claim was valid as of the 2003 amendment, your claim remains
valid until you die.
39. There are several Illinois cases that demonstrate unchecked abuse by clergymen. For
example, Father Kownacki was a clergyman in Illinois that, while never successfully prosecuted,
has been the target of several civil suits over the years—many of which were unsuccessful. See,
e.g., Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (following a case filed
in the 2000s against Father Kownacki in which a document produced by the Church contained
several instances of his abuse of minors across Illinois through the 1980s); see also Jesse Bogan,
Priest Abuse: No End in Sight for Damages Caused by Illinois Priest, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
(Oct. 19, 2011), stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/no-end-in-sight-for-damages-causedby-illinois-priest/article_08609a17-4bb1-518c-af63-9a42fd036d36.html [https://perma.cc/L8QCE2PN] (detailing Kownacki’s history of abuse as a member of the clergy in Illinois).
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B. Discovery Rule
The discovery rule delays the commencement of the relevant statute of
limitations until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that he
was injured and that his injury was wrongfully caused.40 Under this rule,
victims in Illinois can toll the statute of limitations by alleging that they
repressed the memory of their sexual abuse. However, the allegations of
repressed memory must be pled with specificity.
For instance, in Horn v. Goodman, a plaintiff successfully alleged that,
prior to turning eighteen, he repressed all memories of his sexual abuse
between ages thirteen and fifteen.41 It was not until 2011 that he
remembered his abuse, and he filed the next year.42 To offer proof of his
repression, he offered evidence of a psychiatrist’s diagnosis of childhood
abuse amnesia that was linked to the priest who abused him.43 The court
distinguished this case, in which the victim suffered a full mental block,
from Softcheck v. Imesch,44 in which the victim only alleged that he was
unaware that such sexual contact was wrong or injurious.45 This
comparison itself draws out a problem with the current state of the law:
A child may not know that such misconduct is wrong, and even as the
victim learns it is wrong as they grow up they may fail to confront the
conduct for a multitude of reasons.
As successful as the victim in Horn was in the 2000s, the discovery
rule fails to adequately protect older victims for two primary reasons.
First, the discovery rule cannot defeat the statute of repose that bars
claims from victims that turned thirty by 1994.46 Second, the discovery
rule was dramatically deflated for a period in Illinois precedent by the

40. See Knox Coll. v. Celotex Corp., 430 N.E.2d 976, 980 (Ill. 1981) (distinguishing knowledge
of an offense and knowledge of an injury accruing from said offense); but see Wisniewski, 943
N.E.2d at 70 (explaining that the statute of repose is not tolled by the discovery rule absent a claim
of fraudulent concealment).
41. See generally Horn v. Goodman, 60 N.E.3d 922 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
42. See id. at 925 (discussing the plaintiff’s recollection of abuse).
43. See id. at 927 (“The complaint lists the psychological disorders with which Horn was
diagnosed by a psychiatrist, including childhood abuse amnesia, and alleges that they were caused
by Goodman’s abuse.”).
44. See Softcheck v. Imesch, 855 N.E.2d 941, 947 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (citing Clay v. Kuhl, 727
N.E.2d 217, 217 (Ill. 2000)) (discussing the lack of a requirement that plaintiffs “must know the
full extent of his or her injuries” before filing suit).
45. See Horn, 60 N.E.3d at 928 (“In contrast [to Softcheck], Horn alleged that he was unable to
remember the sexual contact occurred. He cannot be charged with knowledge of something he did
not remember happened.”).
46. Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43, 70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (citing Goodman
v. Harbor Mkt., 663 N.E.2d 13, 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)) (“Statutes of repose do not incorporate the
discovery rule and generally terminate claims regardless of a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of his
or her cause of action.”).
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“sudden traumatic event” exception.47 This exception essentially held
that because of the intense physical nature of sexual assault, a victim
would have to “reasonably know” that they were injured by the assault.48
It was not until Clay v. Kuhl in 1998 that the Illinois Second District
Appellate Court loosened the sudden traumatic event exception and
expressed the view that the discovery rule should apply to actions
involving childhood sexual abuse.49 Even there the court still dismissed
the victim’s claim on the grounds that failure to learn the “full extent” of
the injuries caused by her childhood sexual abuse was insufficient to toll
the statute of limitations via the discovery rule.50
C. Fraudulent Concealment
As mentioned above, the only way for plaintiffs to defeat the statute of
repose as an affirmative defense was to successfully allege fraudulent
concealment. In this context, if a priest or the clergy as an organization
were to fraudulently conceal information that would alert a plaintiff to his
claim, “there would be an obvious and gross injustice in a rule that allows
a defendant—particularly a defendant who maintains a special
relationship with the plaintiff—to conceal the plaintiff’s cause of action
and then benefit from the statute of repose.”51 Normally, if a defendant
merely fails to report information to a plaintiff that would give rise to a
cause of action, the claim has not been fraudulently concealed.52
Therefore, in instances where an employee of the clergy has knowledge
that another employee is committing sexual misconduct of any degree,
they are under no duty to report it.
The Illinois Legislature crafted an exception to this general rule. To
adequately plead fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must claim (1) that
the defendant affirmatively acted or misrepresented information designed

47. See M.E.H. v. L.H., 669 N.E.2d 1228, 1235 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (applying the sudden
traumatic event exception to hold that the plaintiff’s injury accrued upon attaining majority).
48. See Golla v. Gen. Motors Corp., 657 N.E.2d 894, 899 (Ill. 1995) (“The rationale supporting
this rule is that the nature and circumstances surrounding the traumatic event are such that the
injured party is thereby put on notice that actionable conduct might be involved.”).
49. See Clay v. Kuhl, 696 N.E.2d 1245, 1249–52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (reconsidering its
application of the sudden traumatic event exception in cases where the victim can successfully
plead repressed memory).
50. Id. at 1251. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the opinion makes no express mention
as to whether the court endorses the Second District’s view of the sudden traumatic event exception.
See Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217, 217 (Ill. 2000) (“We need not determine in this case whether
the instances of childhood sexual abuse alleged here must be considered ‘sudden traumatic
events . . . .’”).
51. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 857 N.E.2d 229, 242 (Ill. 2006).
52. See Chi. Park Dist. v. Kenroy Inc., 402 N.E.2d 181, 185 (Ill. 1980) (first citing Jackson v.
Anderson, 189 N.E. 924 (Ill. 1934); then citing Harvey v. Harris Tr. & Savs. Bank, 391 N.E.2d 461
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979); and then citing Nogle v. Nogle, 202 N.E.2d 683 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964)).
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to prevent, and actually preventing, the plaintiff from discovering his
claim; or (2) that the defendant did not “disclose all material facts
concerning the existence of plaintiff’s cause of action against the
defendant and there was a special relationship that existed between
plaintiff and defendant whereby the plaintiff placed trust and confidence
in defendant thereby placing defendant in a position of influence and
superiority over plaintiff.”53 The second option essentially creates a duty
to report information that would give rise to a cause of action where the
defendant has a special relationship to the plaintiff. Courts liken special
relationships to fiduciary relationships and analyze them using the same
framework.
Only where the victim and the defendant have a fiduciary relationship
to one another will mere silence suffice as an affirmative, fraudulent act
of concealment.54 Illinois courts have not been unanimous in finding a
fiduciary relationship between a parish and its parishioners.55 While there
are undoubtedly similarities between a fiduciary relationship and that of
priest and parishioner,56 recent precedent would suggest that courts apply
fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether or not such a relationship
exists.57
Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville presents a victim-friendly example
of the court’s application of the fraudulent concealment exception, but it
is by no means the status quo result for victims pleading it. In Wisniewski,
the victim was abused by his priest, Father Kownacki, in the 1970s and
alleged that he did not discover his claim until 2002 following news
stories surrounding the Boston scandals.58 He presented evidence in
53. Such a finding must be made by clear and convincing evidence for the plaintiff to ultimately
prevail. Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43, 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
54. See Kenroy, Inc., 402 N.E.2d at 185 (“[T]he person occupying the relation of fiduciary or
of confidence is under a duty to reveal the facts to the plaintiff . . . , and that his silence when he
ought to speak, or his failure to disclose what he ought to disclose, is as much a fraud at law as an
actual affirmative false representation or act; and that mere silence on his part as to a cause of
action . . . amounts to a fraudulent concealment.”).
55. Compare Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1438 (7th Cir. 1994) (declining to find the
defendants, “spiritual and religious advisors” to the plaintiff, in the position of fiduciary “under the
law of Illinois”), and Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446, 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding that
several jurisdictions apply fiduciary duties to sexual relationships between clerics and counselees,
but declining that such a fiduciary relationship exists under Illinois law), with Wisniewski, 943
N.E.2d at 77 (finding that such a fiduciary relationship existed based on a fact-intensive inquiry).
56. See Amato, 679 N.E.2d at 454 (“[W]e agree with the courts in [other] jurisdictions that the
relationship between a cleric and parishioner reflects many aspects of a fiduciary one . . . .”).
57. See Wisniewski, 943 N.E.2d at 77 (distinguishing other Illinois precedent that found no such
fiduciary duty from the case at bar because said cases did not interpret a duty for the purpose of
finding fraudulent concealment). Ultimately, the court determined that a fiduciary duty in this
context exists if the plaintiff “placed his trust and confidence in the Diocese thereby placing the
Diocese in a position of influence and superiority over him.” Id.
58. Id. at 70.
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support of his claim that he repressed the memories, and also presented a
church-produced document which traced the several instances of
Kownacki’s abuse to multiple victims across Illinois.59
The court focused on the second prong. It noted that the plaintiff’s
family was very active in the church, the victim served as an altar boy,
and he and his siblings were taught to obey agents of the Catholic
Church.60 The court found the evidence overwhelmingly established that
the victim placed his trust and confidence in the Diocese and that the
Diocese accepted, encouraged, and promoted it.61 The court further found
that the Church’s silence prevented him from discovering his injuries
until late in life.62
Despite Wisniewski’s success, fraudulent concealment is a very high
bar to prove. The plaintiff in Wisniewski met this standard with damning
evidence presented in a document accounting the several instances of
Father Kownacki’s abuse in various churches around Illinois. Such a
foolproof document might not exist in every case, especially in the case
of older victims. If an institution thoroughly conceals the history of its
members’ abuse, then it will not be uncovered—no matter how fraudulent
the concealment.
Unfortunately, many victims of sexual abuse in Illinois have claims
that do not fall squarely into the discovery rule or fraudulent concealment
exceptions. While recent amendments to the Child Sex Abuse Statute in
Illinois show that it is attempting to remove impediments which would
prevent victims of abuse to bringing their claims, there is still more work
to do in reaching older victims with viable claims.
D. Other States
Several other states have faced the issue of retroactive application of
these limitations statutes, some of which were able to overcome it. In
recent years, three states—New York, New Jersey, and California—
heavily amended their statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse.
In contrast to Illinois, and prior to their amendment, these laws were selfproclaimed, woefully dated, and their amendments were supported by

59. Id. at 55–56 (discussing the existence of a report prepared by someone in the diocese
cataloguing Kownacki’s behavior).
60. Id. at 74−75.
61. Id. at 75 (“[T]he Diocese itself fostered, promoted, and encouraged this trusting relationship
by urging its parishioners to trust their priests’ ‘knowledge, piety, prudence, experience, and
general character.’”).
62. Id. at 79–80 (finding that a jury could have concluded that the evidence demonstrated
fraudulent concealment by silence).
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modern concerns, many of which were of equal concern to the Illinois
General Assembly when it passing of the civil statute back in 2013.63
New Jersey had the most out-of-date legislation at the time of its
amendment, offering victims only a two-year statute of limitations,
though it could be tolled by the discovery exception.64 The new law,
Senate Measure 477 (S477), allows victims of childhood sexual abuse to
file a civil suit by the time they turn fifty-five, or with seven years of
discovering an injury from their abuse.65 Most notable of New Jersey’s
Act is that it increased the scope of potentially liable victims. Previously,
victims were restricted from filing suit against nonprofit organizations
and public entities.66 Not only did S477 open such entitles up to liability,
but it opened them up to retroactive liability in cases of willful, wanton,
or grossly negligent acts that resulted in childhood sexual abuse; and for
acts of negligence in hiring, supervising, and retaining employees and
agents that led to sexual abuse of minors.67 S477 also provided for a
general “look-back window” of two years, allowing for those whose
claims would have been time-barred under previous legislation to bring
suit against offenders.68
Before New Jersey’s amendments, however, New York was first of the
three states to make its amendment through passage of the Child Victims
Act.69 The Act intended to “shift the significant and lasting costs of child
sexual abuse to the responsible parties.”70 The statute of limitations
originally restricted victims to bring suit by age twenty-three at the latest
but was expanded to allow actions until the victim turned fifty-five.71 In

63. See H.R. TRAN., 2013 REG. SESS. NO. 55, at 20–21 (Ill. 2013) (“The reality is that it is
difficult to determine when a victim may have discovered abuse and injury. Therefore, this Bill
gives people impacted by childhood sexual abuse every opportunity to seek redress for the injuries
they have suffered.”).
64. N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A:14-2 (2019).
65. S.B. 477, 218th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2019).
66. See N.J. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., S.B. NO. 477 REPORT, 218th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess., at
§ 4 (2019) (“The household limitation would be deleted by the bill, so that passive abuser liability
could apply to any individual person, or private or public entity, who takes custody and control of
children even on limited, temporary basis . . . .”).
67. Id. (“[A]s amended by the bill . . . organizational liability for an act of negligently hiring,
supervising, or retaining a person resulting in abuse against a child could be applied retroactively
in lawsuits filed under the new, extended statute of limitations period.”). These identified tort
claims are the exact same as those available to Illinois victims of childhood sexual abuse seeking
to bring civil actions. See, e.g., Doe v. Coe, 135 N.E.3d 1, 12 (Ill. 2019) (explaining Illinois tort
claims for childhood sexual abuse against public entities).
68. S.B. 477, 218th Leg., 2d Annual Sess. (N.J. 2019).
69. S.B. 2440, 242d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
70. NEW YORK COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT: S.B. 2440, 242d Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2019), text of the bill available at https://www.hbsslaw.com/child-sexual-abuse/newyork-child-victims-act-ny-bill-s2440 [https://perma.cc/2CWF-H226].
71. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208 (McKinney 2019).
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Section 2 of the Act, the legislature went on to craft a “look-back
window” for victims whose claims were previously time-barred to file
suit under the new expanded limitations. The window was set to last one
year, starting six months after the Child Victims Act took effect.72 Meant
to serve as a preparation period, the delay allows victims to build their
cases prior to filing suit in the hope that it would expedite litigation.
Finally, California most recently passed Assembly Bill No. 218 on
October 13, 2019.73 The law went into effect on January 1, 2020. Under
the law, victims of childhood sexual abuse may file civil claims in
connection to that abuse until their fortieth birthday, or within three years
of discovering their injuries were in connection to the abuse.74 Like both
New York and New Jersey, the law grants a look-back window allowing
victims, regardless of age, to file suit until January 1, 2023.75 The law
then goes further and provides for treble damages against a defendant(s)
who is found to have covered up the sexual abuse76—essentially
increased damages for fraudulent concealment.
California’s piecemeal progress towards expanding child victims’
rights to file their civil case has been a long and arduous road. In fact, two
prior bills, Senate Bill 131 and Assembly Bill 3120, attempted to
accomplish nearly identical goals as Assembly Bill 218 in 2013 and 2018
respectively.77 Both were passed through the legislature but met their
demise by veto from then-Governor Jerry Brown.78 The Third Reading
of Assembly Bill 218 appears to reveal why California’s path towards
creating more liberal pleadings in this area has been so difficult. Powerful
entities like private and public schools, religious institutions, insurance
companies, and other organizations have opposed changes in this area of
the law for decades.
All of the opponents raise the same basic concerns: it is very difficult to
defend against old claims when records and witnesses may be
unavailable, insurance may no longer be available, and the cost of
defending these actions could be astronomical and could prevent the
impacted entities from being able to support their main work.79

However, the author of Assembly Bill 218, Assemblywoman Lorena
Gonzalez, makes clear, “There should not be a reasonable expectation
that if simply enough time passes, there will be no accountability for these
72. S.B. 2440, 242d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
73. A.B. 218, Cal. 2019−2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
74. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 2020).
75. Id. § 340.1(q) (imposing a three-year window of retroactive application).
76. Id. § 340.1(b)(1).
77. See generally S.B. 131, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); see also A.B. 3120, 2018 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (introducing reforms beyond S.B. 131, and nearly identical to A.B. 218).
78. S. RULES COMM., THIRD READING, S. 2019-218, Reg. Sess., at 5–6 (Cal. 2019).
79. ASSEMB., THIRD READING, Assemb. 2019-218, Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. 2019).
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despicable past acts by individuals and entities. This bill ensures that
“time’s up” for the perpetrators of childhood sexual assault, not for
victims.”80 This sentiment expressed by Gonzalez appears to resonate not
only with California residents and politicians but also with other states
and local governments around the nation.
Amongst each of the three most recent amendments to state legislation,
the prevailing trend is clear: retroactive application of the updated statute
of limitations is imperative to allow victims achieve even-handed
application and address public policy concerns. Each state already had
discovery and fraudulent concealment exceptions within their respective
legislation, in fact they went so far as to expand access to damages for
these exceptions in their new laws. However, the states’ assemblies
clearly concluded that despite these exceptions, victims need more to
access meaningful redress. Illinois should follow the same path.
II. DISCUSSION: CASE LAW BARRING RETROACTIVITY
This Part will explore the history of Illinois case law and how its
interpretation of statutory retroactivity is rested on flawed precedent. As
it moves forward, the Part will narrow its focus to recent Illinois Supreme
Court cases on the question of retroactivity more generally, and finally
hone in on retroactivity applied to childhood sexual abuse.
A. Ancient Origins
Illinois courts have shown reluctance to apply the updated statutes of
limitations to childhood sexual abuse, citing case law that tracks back
over one hundred years.81 A closer look at the referenced precedent
shows an inconsistency of opinion between the state and federal supreme
courts.
In Campbell v. Holt, decided in 1885, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the retroactive application of legislation in the context of
creditors seeking declaratory judgment against debtors.82 The debtor
there asserted that he had a right to rely upon the previously enacted
statute of limitations which would have barred the creditors action, but
the Supreme Court rejected this contention.83 In doing so, the Court found
80. Id.
81. See Diocese of Dall. II, 917 N.E.2d 475, 484 (Ill. 2009) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Blodgett, 40
N.E.1025, 1026 (Ill. 1895)) (“[W]hen the bar of a statute of limitations has become complete by
the running of the full statutory period, the right to plead the statute as a defense is a vested right,
which cannot be destroyed by legislation . . . .”).
82. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 620−21 (1885) (detailing facts of the case).
83. See id. at 622 (“The defendants . . . insisted that the bar of the statute, being complete and
perfect, could not, as a defense, be taken away . . . and that to do so would violate that part of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which declares that no state shall
‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.’”).
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a distinction between traditional property rights versus the incorporeal
right to a debt owed.84 It noted that, in the context of a contract for
payment in exchange for property, the “nature and character” of the
contract never changed, and that the statute of limitations that controlled
it was “a purely arbitrary creation of law[.]”85 It went on to explain that
“no right is destroyed when the law restores a remedy which had been
lost.”86
This opinion was 7-2, however, leaving a dissent penned by Justice
Bradley and joined by Justice Harlan. It is this dissenting opinion that the
Illinois Supreme Court endorsed ten years later in Board of Education of
Normal School District v. Blodgett.87 In Blodgett, the Illinois Supreme
Court addressed the same defense addressed in Campbell, but in the
context of the Illinois Constitution. It asked whether the statute of
limitations as a defense became a vested right protected by the Illinois
Due Process Clause in the context of a then-recently expanded limitations
period that offered creditors on certain bonds a cause of action against
public entities.88 The court began with its own analysis, founded loosely
in adverse possession theory of property law.89 Under that theory, the
court explained that the original right-holder to physical property
becomes entirely divested of his right upon the possessor’s claim of right,
effectively making the possessor the new and sole owner.90 The court
then extended this idea to other sorts of actions related to recovering real
or personal property, money demands, or damages from torts.91
84. See id. at 623−24 (arguing that it may “very well be held that in an action to recover real or
personal property” that a statute of limitations would act as a complete bar, but “that to remove the
bar which the statute of limitations enables a debtor to interpose to prevent the payment of his debt
stands on very different ground”).
85. Id. at 628.
86. Id.; see also id. (citing Tioga R.R. v. Blossburg & C.R.R., 87 U.S. 137, 143–44 (1873))
(“The statutes of limitation, as often asserted, and especially by this court, are founded in public
needs and public policy—are arbitrary enactments by the law-making power.”).
87. Bd. of Educ. v. Blodgett, 40 N.E. 1025, 1027–28 (Ill. 1895).
88. Id. at 1025–26.
89. See id. at 1026 (discussing vested title in the context of “property”). While the court insists
that its understanding is “detached from tangible property,” its analysis makes no reference to how,
if at all, it understands tangible property to be different from intangible property. Id. However, in
citing to secondary sources, the court quotes language that hints the two are different: “Regarding
the circumstances under which a man may be said to have a vested right to a defense against a
demand made by another, it is somewhat difficult to lay down a comprehensive rule which the
authorities will justify.” Id. (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 454 (6th ed. 1890)).
90. This seems to be, though unlabeled in the opinion, a description of adverse possession. Id.
91. See id. at 1027 (“[T]he bar of a statute of limitations as a defense . . . after the statute has
run, is a vested right, and cannot be taken away by legislation . . . and that it is immaterial whether
the action is for the recovery of real or personal property, or for the recovery of a money demand,
or for the recovery of damages for a tort.” (citations omitted)).
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The court next declined to extend the holding in Campbell to Illinois
precedent, finding the dissent “most in consonance” with Illinois law.92
In doing so, the court declared that the right to a prosecution is equal to
the right to a defense against it, expressly holding statutes of limitations
in much higher regard than the federal majority had.93 It directly quoted
that “The words ‘life,’ ‘liberty,’ and ‘property’ are constitutional terms,
and are to be taken in their broadest sense.”94 The court clearly decided
this case within the boundaries of the Illinois Constitution, but it
borrowed a substantial portion of the reading and analysis from the
Supreme Court’s analysis of the near-identical federal Due Process
Clause.95
B. Illinois Precedent for Retroactivity Generally
Despite the passing of 125 years, Blodgett maintains its vitality as the
underpinning to Illinois courts’ understanding of retroactive application
of law. However, in the past twenty-five years, Illinois courts went
through a shift in its own understanding based on modern applications of
retroactive amendments to legislation.96 This back-and-forth in the state
supreme court resulted in uncertainty as to the reach of retroactivelyintended amendments, and, while left untouched since 2003, the court
still has work to do.
The first case that the Illinois Supreme Court decided in this line of
cases was First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead.97 In Armstead, the
plaintiff, title-holder to underground petroleum storage tanks, was
inclined to register its out-of-operation tanks with the state’s fire marshal
for limited benefits and compensation.98 It applied for registration in
March 1992, but was rejected based on an amendment, effective
September 1992, that prohibited registration of out-of-operation tanks.99
Turning to its analysis, the Illinois Supreme Court found that Illinois case
law was relatively inconsistent as to retroactive application, and
historically applied either the legislative intent approach, or the vested

92. Id.
93. See id. (quoting Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 631 (1885) (Bradley, J., dissenting))
(“Deprivation of a remedy is equivalent to a deprivation of the right which it is intended to
vindicate . . . .”).
94. Id. (quoting Campbell, 115 U.S. at 630).
95. See id. at 1026−28 (quoting substantial portions of Justice Bradley’s Campbell dissent).
96. See Robert C. Feldmeier, The Illinois Supreme Court’s Latest Last Word on Statutory
Retroactivity, 92 ILL. B. J., May 2004, at 260, 266 (“Caveney marks the third time in the last 10
years that the supreme court has adopted a new standard for determining when new laws apply
retroactively.”).
97. See generally First of Am. Tr. Co. v. Armstead, 664 N.E.2d 36 (Ill. 1996).
98. Id. at 37.
99. Id. at 38.
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rights approach.100 In the legislative intent approach, the court would look
to what the General Assembly intended on the face of the statute as to
whether the law applied retroactively.101 Under the vested rights
approach, however, the court would ignore the examination of legislative
intent and apply the law as it existed at the time of appeal unless it were
to interfere with some vested right attached through the Illinois Due
Process Clause.102
The Armstead court endorsed the vested rights approach, focusing
entirely on what rights might be taken away from the litigants by
application of the amended law and doing away with the legislative intent
approach.103 It found that a “vested right” is a tricky thing to define and
settled on calling it “a complete and unconditional demand or exemption
that may be equated with a property interest.”104 Based on this definition,
the court denied the plaintiff its registration. It found that the legislature
had the duty to set the parameters for obtaining registration, and until
granted such registration, the plaintiff had no vested right to the
compensation and benefits that flowed therefrom.105
Despite the court’s clear endorsement of the vested rights approach in
Armstead, subsequent opinions leaned heavily on interpretations of
legislative intent.106 This inclination gave way to serious doubts raised in
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, just five years
later.107 There, the court all but overruled Armstead, and noted that the
case provided no clarity to Illinois’ jurisprudence regarding retroactive
application of statutory amendments. It opted to remedy the muddled area

100. See id. at 39 (“The principles applicable for determining whether a statutory amendment
applies to an existing controversy on appeal have not been consistent stated. In numerous cases,
this court has focused on determining legislative intent. . . . In yet other cases, this court has largely
ignored the examination of legislative intent and simply applied a general rule providing that a
court should apply the law as it exists at the time of the appeal.” (citations omitted)).
101. See id. (citing People v. Fiorini, 574 N.E.2d 612, 617 (Ill. 1991)) (“In order to divine
legislative intent, this court has sometimes refused to look past the face of the statute.”).
102. See id. (quoting Bates v. Bd. of Educ., 555 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1990)) (“Where the legislature
changes the law pending an appeal, the case must be disposed of by the reviewing court under the
law as it then exists, not as it was when the judgment was entered in the lower court.”).
103. See id. (“Of these two approaches, the better approach is to apply the law that applies by
its terms at the time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere with a vested right.”).
104. See id. at 40 (citing Sepmeyer v. Holman, 642 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (Ill. 1994)).
105. See id. (citing Envirite Corp. v. Ill. E.P.A., 632 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (Ill. 1994)) (noting that
“Plaintiff’s registration process was ongoing at the time of the amendment” and that “there is no
vested right in the mere continuance of a law”).
106. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will Cty. Collector, 749 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Ill. 2001)
(“Although Armstead adopted the vested rights approach to retroactivity, subsequent decisions
from this court have continued to focus on legislative intent to resolve questions concerning the
retroactive application of newly enacted legislation.”).
107. Id.
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of law through adoption of the United States Supreme Court’s Landgraf
analysis.108
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the Supreme Court crafted its own
multi-step analysis to the issue of retroactive applications of statutory
amendments, couched in the legislative intent approach, though it
involved consideration of vested rights.109 A court is to first determine
whether the legislature clearly indicated the temporal reach of an
amended statute.110 If so, that intent must be given effect to the extent it
does not violate constitutional maxims.111 If there is no clearly indicated
intent in the amendment, the court must determine if the amendment
applies retroactively by considering “whether it would impair rights a
party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past
conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already
completed.”112 These latter considerations are founded in due process,
which, the Commonwealth Edison court stated, is not simply a question
of whether rights are or are not vested, rather, it requires a balance of the
reasons for and against the application of the statute to the class of
individuals to whom it will apply.113 The Landgraf Court states that if
there is no legislative intent for retroactive application, but the statute
were to have a retroactive impact, then the presumption against
retroactive application is made.114 This presumption was raised in
Landgraf, and that is where the Supreme Court ended its analysis as it
was not rebutted by clear legislative intent.115
However, where “clear congressional intent” demonstrated a
purposeful, retroactive application, the Commonwealth Edison court
applied a fairness balancing test that asked if retroactive application
108. See id. at 972 (“We have carefully considered the principles discussed in Landgraf and
conclude that the approach to retroactivity described in that opinion provides the appropriate means
of determining when new legislation should be applied to existing controversies.”).
109. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (setting forth the two-pronged
test prior to the Court’s analysis).
110. Id.
111. See id. (“[T]he court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed
the statute’s proper reach.”).
112. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will Cty. Collector, 749 N.E.2d 964, 970–71 (Ill. 2001)
(citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273−74).
113. See id. at 976 (quoting Moore v. Jackson Park Hosp., 447 N.E.2d 408, 416 (Ill. 1983)
(Ryan, C.J., specially concurring)) (“The determination of whether the application of the statute
unreasonably infringes upon the rights of those to whom it applies involves a balancing and
discrimination between reasons for and against the application of the statute to this class of
individuals.”).
114. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280 (“If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional
presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a
result.”).
115. See id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The presumption against statutory retroactivity is
founded upon sound considerations of general policy and practice . . . .”).
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would actually violate due process.116 The court asked whether the
retroactive application was “so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the
constitutional limitation.”117 In making this determination, the court
would consider factors such as the legislative purpose in enacting the
amendment, the length of time in the period of retroactivity, and whether
the party reasonably and detrimentally relied upon the law.118 This
created a gray area between two extremes: retroactive application of law
and violation of due process.
Only two years later, though, the Illinois Supreme Court made another
shift away from settled precedent.119 In Caveney v. Bower, the court
determined that section 4 of the Statute on Statutes prevented the full
application of the Landgraf test, necessitating its stop at the first step
every time.120 Section 4, known as the general savings clause,121 acts as
a legislative directive regarding the interpretation of prospective and
retroactive application of Illinois law.122 The court had previously
determined that the general savings clause could apply matters of
procedural law retroactively, but that matters of substantive law could
only apply prospectively.123 This, paired with the Landgraf test, halted
the analysis at the first step every time.124
Consistent with Caveney, if the Illinois General Assembly passed a
legislative amendment that contained its own unequivocal legislative
intent, the intent would be effectuated so long as it did not violate
constitutional principles. However, if the amendment was silent about
retroactive application, the general savings clause would presume that it
acted prospectively—thus effectuating legislative intent. Either way, the
116. See Commonwealth Edison, 749 N.E.2d at 974 (“A retroactive tax measure does not
necessarily violate the due process provisions of either the Illinois or the Federal constitution.”
(citations omitted)).
117. Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 469 N.E.2d 1067, 1075 (Ill. 1984)).
118. See id. (including also a fourth factor “whether the taxpayer had adequate notice of the
change in the law”). The fourth “notice” factor seems specifically applicable to taxpayers rather
than litigants in general and was ignored by Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas in its analysis of retroactive
application. See Doe A. v. Diocese of Dall. (Diocese of Dall. I), 885 N.E.2d 376, 381–86 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2008).
119. See generally Caveney v. Bower, 797 N.E.2d 596 (Ill. 2003) (modifying the Landgraf test).
120. See id. at 602 (“Thus, section 4 represents a clear legislative directive as to the temporal
reach of statutory amendments and repeals: those that are procedural in nature may be applied
retroactively, while those that are substantive may not.”).
121. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/4 (2020).
122. The statute’s opening line puts it in no uncertain terms: “No new law shall be construed to
repeal a former law, whether such former law is expressly repealed or not . . . .” Id.
123. See Caveney, 797 N.E.2d at 602 (citing People v. Glisson, 782 N.E.2d 251 (Ill. 2002))
(applying the Statute on Statutes as a limitation to retroactive application in the criminal context).
124. See id. at 603 (“Thus, for purposes of Landgraf’s first step, the legislature always will have
clearly indicated the temporal reach of an amended statute, either expressly in the new legislative
enactment or by default in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes.”).
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enactment of Illinois laws and amendments necessarily entail legislative
intent through an underlying presumption towards application
prospectively.
Concurring in result, but dissenting in analysis, Justice Freeman found
the curtailed Landgraf test to be at odds with jurisprudence.125 He found
a clear distinction between retroactive impact and impermissible
retroactive impact.126 He noted that each statute prescribes its own
specific intent, and that to have a general savings clause as a default
seems wholly inconsistent with a proper Landgraf analysis.127
In the context of this article, the issue is implicated when a party
attempts to apply the Landgraf test to a statute that would apply an
amendment to statutes of limitations or repose to revive expired
claims.128
C. Retroactivity in Context of Childhood Sexual Abuse
Currently, the law in Illinois bars childhood sexual abuse victims
whose claims are time-barred from seeking damages through reliance on
the 2014 enactment that struck down the statute of limitations.129 This
ban was first specifically identified in M.E.H. v. L.H. in 1997, prior to
Caveney. The court there, in the wake of the Armstead opinion,
demonstrated the effect of the twelve-year period of repose barring the
claims of two plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, forty-four and forty-five years old,
brought suit in 1995, the year after the repose period was eliminated, and
attempted to sue their parents for childhood sexual abuse-related
claims.130 In barring their claims, the state supreme court held, citing to
Blodgett, that the time-barred claims could not be revived for due process
concerns.131 It stated that the rights to a defense based on the expiration
125. See id. at 606 (Freeman, J., specially concurring) (finding the inquiry into legislative intent
different from the “second step of the analysis, which is whether the statute will have an
impermissible retroactive impact or effect on past conduct”).
126. See id. (“I must point out that just because a newly enacted statute might reach back to
antecedent events does not mean that the statute is impermissibly retroactive.”).
127. See id. at 608 (“In fact, my independent research has failed to unearth a single case in
which a savings statute such as section 4 has been used in the manner advanced by the court
today.”); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 317–20 (2001) (engaging in a full Landgraf analysis
despite the existence of a “federal general savings statute”).
128. See, e.g., Diocese of Dall. II, 917 N.E.2d 475 (Ill. 2009) (declining to apply the second
prong of Landgraf).
129. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202.2(f) (2019) (allowing “at any time” a suit based on
childhood sexual abuse except for those which are not valid at the effective date of the statute).
130. M.E.H. v. L.H., 685 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ill. 1997).
131. See id. at 339 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Blodgett, 40 N.E. 1025 (Ill. 1895)) (“More than a
hundred years ago, our court held that once a statute of limitations has expired, the defendant has a
vested right to invoke the bar of the limitations period as a defense to a cause of action. That right
cannot be taken away by the legislature without offending the due process protections of our state’s
constitution.”).
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of the statute of repose were just as strong as the plaintiff’s rights to bring
the suit itself.132 The court also rejected the alternative arguments that
fairness, equity, and public policy should supersede the defendant’s
concern to a right to a statutory defense.133
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District took issue with this
holding ten years later,134 following the enactment of several
amendments that enlarged the periods of limitations against survivors of
childhood sexual abuse.135 In Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, the Fifth
District set out to determine whether the two-year statute of limitations
or the twelve-year statute of repose applied to the victim of childhood
sexual abuse that turned eighteen in 1988.136 The decision was rendered
in 2008, so the court relied on the Landgraf test. However, after defining
the test the court went on to endorse a full application of the test, holding
that the Illinois Supreme Court in Commonwealth Edison expressly
rejected the application of the Landgraf test without use of the balancing
approach in the second step.137
Based on this finding, the Fifth District began its analysis by noting
the then-current statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse,
allowing victims ten years to file suit or two years upon discovery of
injury, was meant to apply retroactively.138 Its next course of action was
to determine whether retroactive application would violate due process.
The court first considered the General Assembly’s motive for enacting
the amendment. It found that all three amendments made between 1994
and 2003 were motivated by the increased awareness that childhood
sexual abuse victims often suffered long-repressed memories.139 It noted
that the legislature saw a deficiency in its previous statutes, and its
demonstrated effort to cure that deficiency weights in favor of a
132. See id. (“Although the present matter involves a statute of repose rather than a statute of
limitations, there is no basis for applying a different rule.”).
133. See id. at 340 (“They argue that fairness, equity, and public policy demand that L.H. not
be permitted to shield himself from liability based on a statutory provision that was in effect for
only a short time . . . .”).
134. Diocese of Dall. I, 885 N.E.2d 376, 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
135. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (detailing the various amendments to section
5/13-202.2).
136. See Diocese of Dall. I, 885 N.E.2d at 381 (detailing the factual background).
137. See id. at 382 (quoting Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield in Ill., 857 N.E.2d 737, 741 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2006) (Chapman, J., dissenting)) (“‘The second step of this inquiry is essentially the same
as the vested rights approach to retroactivity. . . .’ The vested rights approach utilized before
Commonwealth Edison Co. remains relevant to our consideration . . . .”).
138. See id. at 384 (finding that the statute “evinces a clear legislative intent” to apply
retroactively).
139. See id. at 385 (citing Pedigo v. Pedigo, 686 N.E.2d 1180, 1185 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)) (“All
three amendments the legislature made to the statute were motivated by an increasing awareness of
the fact that the type of abuse alleged by the plaintiff is by its very nature subject to long-repressed
memories.”).
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retroactive application.140 The court next examined the period which
retroactive application would cover, noting that it would be thirteen-anda-half-years—a long time which weighed against retroactive
application.141 It finally considered detrimental reliance, the final
consideration of the Landgraf balance. The Diocese contended that the
passage of time, more than twenty-two years “based upon a ‘single 15minute incident’” would subject the defendants to substantial
prejudice.142 The court, however, rejected the notion that defendants
could have detrimentally relied on the statute of limitations, stating that
difficulties that may exist in defending against an action like the
plaintiff’s do not come from retroactive application of amendments, but
instead from the legislature’s judgment to place this burden on the
defendants.143 Essentially, it held that the legislature made this decision
for the express purpose of expanding these claims in favor of victims, and
this exact difficulty will exist for defendants against victims of abuse at
any point in the future now that the statute of limitations is so dramatically
expanded. The court resolved to say that its balance of fairness and
reasoning resulted in a finding that retroactive application of the
amendment was proper.144
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, however, the defendants
carried the day. The court agreed with the Fifth District in stating that the
legislature intended the amendment to apply retroactively; however, it
departed from the lower court and rested on the Caveney rationale which
found no reason to apply the second step of the Landgraf test.145 It then
upheld the outcome of M.E.H. v. L.H., that the cause of action was already
time-barred under the prior versions of the limitations period, and
therefore the 2003 amendment could not revive it.146 In a crucial footnote,
the court swept under the rug its reasoning for not applying the second140. See id. (citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will Cty. Collector, 749 N.E.2d 964, 975 (Ill.
2001)) (“That desire to fix the problems inherent in a previous version of a statute weighs in favor
of a retroactive application.”).
141. See id. (citing Commonwealth Edison, 749 N.E.2d at 975) (noting that lengthy periods of
retroactivity weigh against retroactive application).
142. Id.
143. See id. (discussing the realities of evidentiary problems such as expired evidence—and
witnesses—but citing the legislature’s intent that placing the burden on defendants is sufficient to
shift these problems out of consideration).
144. See id. at 385−86 (citing Commonwealth Edison, 749 N.E.2d at 976) (“In balancing
fairness considerations and the reasons for and against the retroactive application of the statutory
change, we conclude that the retroactive application does not unreasonably infringe on any due
process right.”).
145. See Diocese of Dall. II, 917 N.E.2d 475, 483 (Ill. 2009) (“[I]n light of section 4 [of the
Statute on Statutes], Illinois courts need never go beyond the threshold step of the Landgraf test.”).
146. See id. at 485 (“Under the line of authorities including M.E.H. v. L.H . . . , the version of
section 13-202.2 as amended in 2003 . . . therefore could not be applied to revive plaintiff’s
claims.”).
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step of the Landgraf test—it was unnecessary based on the previouslyadjudicated finding that the defense of an expired limitations period is a
vested right.147
III. ANALYSIS
At this point in Illinois jurisprudence, the Illinois Supreme Court, and
several appellate districts,148 have resigned to the view that the expiration
of the statute of limitations and/or repose results in an affirmative defense
to defendants that is insulated from retroactive legislation by the Illinois
Constitution’s Due Process Clause. This section will analyze first why
there is a legitimate question regarding whether or not the expiration of a
statute of limitations creates such a vested right in a defendant. It will
challenge the general understanding of why the expiration of the statutory
limitations and repose periods create vested rights, and why those
underpinnings are inapplicable in the context of limitations statutes
relating to childhood sexual abuse actions. Finally, it will explore the
understanding of due process in other states and how they came to
different results than Illinois.
A. What Else is Landgraf for?
As explained, Illinois precedent surrounding retroactivity was less than
certain in the late 1990s as the Illinois Supreme Court alternated between
the legislative intent and vested rights approaches. Commonwealth
Edison only momentarily established clarity in the short period before
Caveney curtailed the former holding, effectively cutting the Landgraf
analysis off at the legislative intent prong. In the context of the childhood
sexual abuse cases, Caveney was applied in Doe v. Diocese of Dallas II
and confirmed the retroactive bar to the expanded statutes of limitations.
Prior to the supreme court’s review, however, the Fifth District
managed to lodge a persuasive argument for retroactive application of the
amended statute. The Fifth District’s interpretation of retroactivity
precedent in Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas I relied on the original adoption
of the Landgraf test in Commonwealth Edison, which it interpreted to
“mandate” the full Landgraf test.149 In doing so, it noted that previouslyadjudicated “vested rights” are relevant to the inquiry of whether due
147. See id. at 486 n.3 (declining to engage in an analysis of whether due process would consider
the right to an affirmative defense in the expired statute of limitations because “[c]ase law already
tells us what the answer must be. Under M.E.H. and the cases which proceeded it, once the time
has passed in which a claim may be asserted, due process prohibits legislative action that would
resuscitate it.”).
148. Including the Fifth District despite its non-unanimity between Galloway and Diocese of
Dallas.
149. See Diocese of Dall. I., 885 N.E.2d at 382 (referencing the “balancing approach mandated
by Landgraf and Commonwealth Edison Co”).
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process is offended, but that such a determination is not decisive.150
Instead, upon a finding that a statutory amendment would offend due
process, “the court must go further in its analysis and determine if the
retroactive application unreasonably infringes on the rights
implicated.”151 Continuing in this analysis, the court would base its
“reasonableness” inquiry in the balancing test set forth in Landgraf.152
This conclusion is in consonance with Commonwealth Edison. It
advocates for a thorough examination of what is at the core of a “vested
right,” ignoring those rights that were previously “labeled ‘vested’ or
‘non vested.’”153 The court argued that such rights were not decisive in
jurisprudence because they were yet to be tested under the second prong
of the Landgraf test154—a framework that was designed for just such a
determination. It maintains and values previously-adjudicated vested
rights but subjects them to updated constitutional standards. Among the
several cases it cited to, the court specifically referenced M.E.H. v. L.H.,
questioning the vitality of the vested-right therein without meaningful
examination per Landgraf.155 The court pointed to the fact that previously
adjudicated vested rights were determined under various formulations
due to Illinois courts’ inconsistent stance on retroactive application.156

150. See id. (quoting Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield in Ill., 857 N.E.2d 737, 741 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2006) (Chapman, J., dissenting)) (“The retroactivity cases that predate the supreme court’s
decision in Commonwealth Edison Co. are thus still relevant.”).
151. Id.
152. See id. (noting that other Illinois courts “failed to utilize the balancing test mandated by
Landgraf and Commonwealth Edison Co.”); see, e.g., Henrich v. Libertyville High Sch., 712
N.E.2d 298, 310 (Ill. 1998) (“It is settled that where the legislature changes the law pending an
appeal, a reviewing court should simply apply the law as it exists at the time of the appeal, unless
doing so would interfere with a vested right.”); M.E.H. v. L.H., 685 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ill. 1997)
(“More than a hundred years ago, our court held that once a statute of limitations has expired, the
defendant has a vested right to invoke the bar of the limitations period as a defense to a cause of
action.”); D.P. v. M.J.O., 640 N.E.2d 1323, 1328 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“In Illinois, as in the majority
of jurisdictions, the right to set up the bar of the statute of limitations, after the statute has run, as a
defense to a cause of action, has been held to be a vested right which cannot be taken away by
statute, regardless of the nature of the cause of action.”).
153. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will Cty. Collector, 749 N.E.2d 964, 976 (Ill. 2001)
(quoting In re Marriage of Semmler, 481 N.E.2d 716 (1985)) (“In assessing whether the application
of a new statutory amendment to an existing controversy violates due process, the question is not
simply whether the ‘rights’ allegedly impaired are [labeled] ‘vested’ or ‘non-vested.’” (quotations
omitted) (alterations in original)).
154. See Diocese of Dall. I, 885 N.E.2d at 383 (citing Commonwealth Edison, 749 N.E.2d at
976) (“Concluding the analysis without using the balancing test is an approach expressly rejected
by the supreme court.”).
155. Id. at 382–83 (citing M.E.H., 685 N.E.2d at 339).
156. See id. (citing Commonwealth Edison, 749 N.E.2d at 971) (“In shifting to the legislative
intent approach, courts have become more deferential to legislative determinations that the benefits
of a retroactive application of a statute outweigh these concerns.”).
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After a full analysis, the court found the defendants had no vested rights
in their defenses.157
The court closed its opinion by noting a lack of unanimity across all
Illinois Courts and even its own District.158 It specifically referenced
Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield in Illinois,159 a case which upheld
M.E.H.’s determination that the childhood sexual abuse statutes created
vested rights in defendants. The distinction between Galloway and Doe
v. Diocese of Dallas I rests in each courts’ interpretation of the deference
that should be afforded to previously-adjudicated vested rights.160
Galloway gave much stronger deference to the M.E.H. court’s
determination that the statute created an affirmative defense such that the
court declined to engage in the fairness inquiry. This is inconsistent with
a full Landgraf analysis.
Landgraf was not adopted for only its first prong—it was adopted to
resolve the tension between inconsistent opinions and apply a unified
standard.161 On several occasions throughout the Commonwealth Edison
opinion, the court references former opinions that confused precedent,
but declined to overrule them to the extent that they informed the court
moving forward. For instance, it examined Heinrich v. Libertyville High
School and admitted that its relevance extended “insofar as it defines
those interests that are protected from legislative interference,” but the
court did not take the vested-right found in Heinrich to supersede its own
analysis under Landgraf.162 The court rejected the idea that a former
decision’s “label” was sufficient and instead found that a careful balance
founded between the fairness and discrimination of the retroactive
application was important to determine “whether the application of the
statute unreasonably infringes upon the rights of those to whom it
applies . . . .”163 Without disturbing the findings made in Heinrich, the
157. An interesting note is that the court here made no reference to the Caveney opinion. See
generally id. It clearly shared the opinion of Justice Freeman (and the authors) that the legislative
intent prong of Landgraf does not satisfy the latter prong of whether the amendment violates due
process—regardless of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes.
158. See id. at 383–86 (detailing the full analysis and conclusion).
159. See generally Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield in Ill., 857 N.E.2d 737 (Ill. App. Ct.
2006).
160. Compare Galloway, 857 N.E.2d at 739−40 (finding that “M.E.H. is still good law, and we
are compelled to abide by it” in concluding that the vested right has been predetermined), with
Diocese of Dall. I, 885 N.E.2d at 383 (“We conclude that we must reconsider the retroactivity of
the 1993 amendment under the principles announced in Commonwealth Edison Co.”).
161. See Commonwealth Edison, 749 N.E.2d at 972 (“We further observe that the Landgraf test
adequately resolves the ‘tension’ reflected in our case law in decisions such as Armstead . . . we
hereby adopt the approach to retroactivity set forth in Landgraf.”).
162. Id. at 976.
163. Id. (quoting Moore v. Jackson Park Hosp., 447 N.E.2d 408, 416 (Ill. 1983) (Ryan, C.J.,
specially concurring)).
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court noted that the facts between that case and the one at bar were
distinguishable and supported its own analysis into whether its ultimate
finding would unreasonably infringe upon due process.
B. Varying Degrees of Vested Rights
In addition to the court’s treatment of the Landgraf test in
Commonwealth Edison, the origins of Illinois courts’ determination that
an expired statute of limitations creates a vested right in a defendant
highlights a distinction between this traditional determination and how it
applies to the childhood sexual abuse limitations statute.
The Blodgett opinion was founded almost entirely in an examination
of theories of property law; with a subsequent reliance on Justice Story’s
dissent in Campbell v. Holt.164 It examined the understanding of property
rights in tangible things and real property, and then, without analysis, tied
the idea of rights and title in these tangible things to incorporeal rights
such as “the recovery of damages for a tort.”165 The list of differences
between these theories—that of adverse possession and the idea that a
sex-offender has a right to avoid suit after a pre-determined length of
time—is endless and not worthy of protracted analysis.
The Supreme Court’s opinion recognizes such a distinction. As
Campbell found, there should be no right in a debtor to rely upon an
expired statutory period as a defense against the creditor.166 There,
through examination of contract law, the Court denied this sort of
defense, belittling its foundation by calling statutes of limitations “purely
arbitrary creation[s] of the law.”167 It went on to determine what exactly
a vested right was in its analysis that draws several parallels to the
Commonwealth Edison and Landgraf opinions.
In neither the federal nor Illinois constitutions does the phrase “vested
right” appear—the term is entirely a creature of common law.168 Neither
constitution makes “an act of state legislation void merely because it has
some retrospective operation.”169 Commonwealth Edison is definitive

164. See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Blodgett, 40 N.E. 1025 (Ill. 1895).
165. Id. at 1027.
166. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 629 (1885) (“We can understand a right to enforce
the payment of a lawful debt. . . . But we do not understand the right to satisfy that obligation by a
protracted failure to pay. We can see no right which the promisor has in the law which permits him
to plead lapse of time instead of payment, which shall prevent the legislature from repealing that
law because its effect is to make him fulfill his honest obligations.”).
167. Id. at 628.
168. See id. (“But when we get beyond this, although vested rights may exist, they are better
described by some more exact term, as the phrase itself is not one found in the language of the
Constitution.”).
169. Chase Sec. Corp v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315 (1945). In a reevaluation of Campbell,
the Supreme Court upheld its precedent and has relied upon it without reconsideration since. Id.
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proof of that. The Court advises that while a “vested right” is understood
in a general sense, one must “get beyond” this general understanding and
describe them “more exact[ly]” in a given case.170 There, it did not make
logical sense to apply a “vested right” against a creditor where a debtor
failed to pay its debt on an otherwise valid contract. To circumvent this
contract with something like a limitations period would effectively take
“arbitrary enactments” of public policy and create a right in the lapse of
time in favor of the debtor and to the detriment of the creditor—stripping
away the creditor’s rights.
This discussion, over one hundred years prior to Landgraf, is
consistent with the balancing test described in the second prong of the
test. It considers not the general idea of applying statutes of limitations
retroactively, but the application of a specific statute retroactively.171 To
over-inclusively apply a bar to retroactive application of statutes of
limitations on the basis of its effect in a certain area of law, like adverse
possession, will unevenly affect other areas of law, like limitations on
childhood sexual abuse, that are founded in entirely different public
needs. In some instances “no right is destroyed when the law restores a
remedy which has been lost,” where in others due process might be
violated and a vested right would be destroyed.172
This is all to say that there is room for interpretation of a given statute,
and there is a method for interpretation prescribed by Landgraf through
Commonwealth Edison. While the holding in M.E.H. remains valid in that
its holding is informative of what does and does not constitute a vested
right in the context of childhood sexual abuse statutes of limitations, it
was not adequately tested by the Illinois-endorsed Landgraf test, nor is it
representative of a thorough analysis of the current statute.

170. See Campbell, 115 U.S. at 628 (finding that the bare term “vested right” is not understood
to mean “that a right to defeat a just debt by the statute of limitations is a vested right, so as to be
beyond legislative power in a proper case”).
171. Throughout the entire discussion of Landgraf in Commonwealth Edison, the court
references, singularly, “an amended statute” in the context of its analysis. Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Will Cty. Collector, 749 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Ill. 2001). At no point does the court suggest that
concepts previously tested in different statutes or statutory frameworks are decisive in applying a
similar, or even exact concept, in the context of a different statute. Therefore, it makes little sense
to say that the affirmative defense to a statute of limitations expiration in one statutory framework
applies to every such statutory framework to create a vested right. The legislature is more complex
in its ambitions and so the intent behind the statute of limitations in the context of childhood sexual
abuse is vastly different than intent behind limitations in the context of, for example, tax-break
registration periods for underground fuel tanks.
172. Campbell, 115 U.S. at 628; see also Donaldson, 325 U.S. at 315−16 (“[C]ertainly it cannot
be said that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse
of time is per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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C. Application of Landgraf
An actual application of Landgraf’s second-prong only confirms the
need for a second look at M.E.H.’s conclusion that the statutes’
expirations create vested rights.173 In the instances where the second
prong has been applied, even though overturned or disagreed with by the
majority, courts have convincingly found in favor of plaintiffs and against
a declaration that the statutes would create a vested right. This outcome
is even more convincing when it is applied to the current statute which
eliminated the statute of limitations in 2014.
As Commonwealth Edison dictated, after finding that the plain and
unambiguous legislative text commands retroactive application, it will be
effectuated absent constitutional violations.174 To determine whether a
retroactive application is “so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the
constitutional limitation,” the court will consider the legislative purpose
behind the statute,175 the length of the period of retroactivity,176 and
whether the opposing party reasonably and detrimentally relied on the
prior law.177
The legislative purpose behind the childhood sexual abuse statute of
limitations is informed by the last three decades of reform. Ever since the
statute of repose was abolished, the legislature has significantly expanded
the statute of limitations and discovery exception periods every time it
went to amend it.178 Each amendment was made with the understanding
that these particular injuries are unique in that they subject the plaintiff to
long-repressed memories.179 Each amendment has made it easier to file a
claim on this basis, which demonstrates an intent to fix a problem in
173. For a complete example in the context of a previous amendment to the civil statute of
limitations in the context of childhood sexual abuse, see Diocese of Dall. I, 885 N.E.2d 376, 384–
86 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
174. See Commonwealth Edison, 749 N.E.2d at 971 (“[I]f the legislature has clearly indicated
what the temporal reach of an amended statute should be, then, absent a constitutional prohibition,
that expression of legislative intent must be given effect.”).
175. See id. at 974 (first citing United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 32 (1994); and then citing
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266–67 (1994)) (noting the Landgraf court’s
acknowledgment that legislative purpose is relevant to retroactive legislation because the
legislature may use retroactive legislation retributively against unpopular groups or individuals).
176. See id. (citing Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32–33) (explaining that a retroactive measure does not
necessarily violate the due process provisions of the Illinois or United States Constitutions but
rather that a court must consider the nature of the measure).
177. See id. (citing Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 469 N.E.2d 1067, 1075 (Ill. 1984)) (explaining
that the reasonableness of a retroactive measure depends on various circumstances).
178. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (detailing the various amendments to section
5/13-202.2).
179. See Diocese of Dall. I, 885 N.E.2d 376, 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (citing Pedigo v. Pedigo,
686 N.E.2d 1180, 1185 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)) (“All three amendments the legislature made to the
statute were motivated by an increasing awareness of the fact that the type of abuse alleged by the
plaintiff is by its very nature subject to long-repressed memories.”).
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previous versions of the statute—a factor that weighs in favor of
retroactive application.180
The period of retroactivity is uncertain in this instance, as this analysis
is not based off of a particular pattern of facts.181 However, even if the
fact pattern uncovered a fifty-year window of retroactivity, a period that
would ordinarily weigh heavily against retroactive application, the
current state of the law undercuts the weight of such a long retroactivity
period. In all cases moving forward, the length of time passed since the
injury is entirely irrelevant because there is no statute of limitations to
apply.182 Long periods of retroactivity weigh against application because
of common-sense reasons like difficulty in obtaining evidence,
contacting relevant persons, detrimental reliance by opposing parties,183
and other practical requirements of informing a fair trial.184 These are
logical considerations in barring retroactive claims of fifty years in
normal circumstances, but because the legislature eliminated any
temporal bar on claims moving forward, these are issues that can and will
be faced in the future with the legislature’s express blessing.185 The
legislature has made the affirmative decision to disregard the practical
realities involved in childhood sexual abuse survivors bringing claims
against their abusers because they may not confront their injuries
themselves until much later in life. To prevent those who suffered abuse
in the 1970s−1980s from bringing a claim today would be no different
than barring someone who suffered abuse in the 2000s−2010s from
bringing a claim in 2050. This arbitrary result should hold no weight
against retroactive application.
180. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will Cty. Collector, 749 N.E.2d 964, 975 (Ill. 2001)
(approving the legislative motive to correct previously existing law).
181. Though, normally, a lengthy period of retroactivity weighs against retroactive application.
Id.
182. See Diocese of Dall. I, 885 N.E.2d at 385 (discussing the legislature’s conscious choices
to lengthen statutory limitations periods which would naturally impose burdens on defendants
seeking to defend against causes of action based on older events).
183. This factor will be addressed more thoroughly below. See infra notes 188–90 and
accompanying text.
184. See Chase Sec. Corp v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (“Statutes of limitation find
their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients,
rather than principles.”).
185. See id. (citing Order of R.R. Tels. V. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944))
(“They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and
the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or
disappeared, and evidence has been lost.”). The fact that the legislature has eliminated such statutes
moving forward means that these realities can and will be faced by courts and defendants. See 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202.2(f) (2019) (declaring that “an action for damages based on childhood
sexual abuse may be commenced at any time”). This underlying rationale, ignored by the
legislature, is the same rationale that defends against expired claims. If the legislature is numbed to
these arguments, why are they still applicable retroactively, despite that the legislature made this
amendment to then-valid claims based on actions years in advance of the amendments?
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Finally, it makes little sense to allege that defendants in such an action
could have detrimentally relied upon the statute of limitations expiration
for several reasons. First, under the constantly amended and changing
statutes in the last three decades, it would be difficult to rely upon any
one statute successfully for any defendant. Even if a defendant guessed
successfully and relied on one of the amendments, then, also successfully,
waited-out his period of limitations, the results are wholly arbitrary. Fifth
District Justice Chapman compellingly demonstrated this through her
own example. In her dissent in Galloway, she found that the defendant
could not have detrimentally relied upon the statute of repose when he
committed the abuse because it was not yet in existence.186 The defendant
only happened to fall into the only three-year window in which the statute
of repose existed, and lucked out with a foolproof defense before it was
eliminated in 1994. To demonstrate the illogical effect, she noted that
were the plaintiff born in 1964, she would have turned thirty after the
statute of repose was eliminated and the claim would never have been
barred.187
Justice Chapman also recognized that there are two sides to the coin in
measuring reliance on the statutes of repose and limitations.188 Clearly,
the legislature sought to amend its own actions by expanding the statutes
of limitations for childhood sexual abuse because it sought to offer
plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity to bring suit. To limit certain
plaintiffs, especially those that were exposed to the two-year limitations
period or twelve-year repose period, is harsh when compared to plaintiffs
who have faced lesser to zero limits upon bringing suit.189 A defendant’s
claim to detrimental reliance, especially reliance on such a constantlyshifting statutory schema, can have no heavier weight than a plaintiff’s
interest in pursuing his or her claim.190
186. See Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield in Ill., 857 N.E.2d 737, 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)
(Chapman, J., dissenting) (“The events at issue occurred decades before the statute of repose was
enacted.”).
187. See id. (detailing her example and concluding that the “difficulties flow, rather, from the
legislature’s judgment that placing this burden on defendants is an acceptable price to pay for
tailoring procedural limitations to provide victims of childhood sexual abuse a reasonable
opportunity to seek redress”).
188. See id. (“The retroactive application of the statute of repose interferes with the plaintiff’s
interest in pursuing a cause of action against the defendants, just as a retroactive application of the
legislation removing the statute of repose interferes with the defendants’ interest in an absolute
defense.”).
189. See id. (noting that courts have previously found this statute of repose included intent to
be applied retroactively); see, e.g., M.E.H. v. L.H., 685 N.E.2d 335, 340 (Ill. 1997) (noting that
legislative intent when enacting the repose period informs what is a reasonable time for filing suit);
Phillips v. Johnson, 599 N.E.2d 4, 7–8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (explaining that concepts of justice,
fairness, and equity weigh for or against retroactive application of a statute).
190. See Galloway, 857 N.E.2d at 743 (Chapman, J., dissenting) (“In other words, the
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In sum, there is value in the independent analysis of retroactive
application in the context of a given statute of limitations. Under Illinois
courts’ current treatment of this issue, all statutes of limitation are similar
in that they create a vested right in defendants when the statute expires.
However, were courts to actually embark on the full Landgraf analysis
mandated by Commonwealth Edison, it would easily conclude that the
current legislation weighs heavily in favor of retroactive application of
the statute of limitations, opening the courts evenly to all afflicted by
injuries related to childhood sexual abuse.
IV. OTHER STATE COURT TREATMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY
This Part will briefly cover other states’ treatments of the retroactivity
issue, as well as public policy. The brevity of these points is not meant to
belittle their magnitude; rather, it is to avoid belaboring them for two
reasons: (1) other state constitutional law is different from Illinois,
despite the several similarities, and (2) the public policy considerations
have been discussed to great extent already in this article and are mostly
obvious.
A. State Treatments
To the extent that one is skeptical that the Illinois Supreme Court
would overturn its unequivocal statement on retroactive application, one
might consider the actions of other states’ high courts. An exhaustive
analysis by the Connecticut Supreme Court provides a strong example of
its own state’s civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse. In
Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., the court recognized
that retroactive application of amended statutes was not unanimously
practiced across all states since Campbell.191 In fact, it noted that among
the fifty states, forty-four of them considered the issue of whether an
extended statute of limitations could constitutionally apply
retroactively.192 Of those forty-four states, eighteen follow the federal
approach announced in Campbell—though Connecticut would become
the nineteenth by then end of the opinion.193

difficulties inherent in defending an action such as the plaintiff’s do not stem from a retroactive
application of the statute itself.”).
191. See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 508–14 (Conn. 2015)
(mentioning and citing to forty-four states which have analyzed Campbell in the context of their
own state constitutions).
192. Id.
193. See id. at 513–14 (first citing Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885); and then citing Chase
Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945)) (“The decisions that follow the federal approach
embodied in Campbell v. Holt . . . and Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson . . . are most consistent
with our body of case law in this area . . . and our constitutional history.”).
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The court found no per se right to the expiration of a statute of
limitation as an affirmative defense under its own due process
precedent194—a stark contrast to Illinois case law. However, the court’s
conclusion relied heavily on public policy consideration in addition to
this ruling.195 The court relied on “considerations of good sense and
justice” to inform its decision;196 it specifically explained that the danger
of defendants being exposed to delayed or unexpected liability was
sufficiently outweighed by recognizing that victims often repress
memories and are unaware of all who are responsible at the time their
injuries manifest years later.197
Again, Connecticut case law lacks the affirmative statement that a
vested right can be created in the expiration of a statute of limitations.
The bodies of Connecticut and Illinois case law differ substantially in that
respect, a factor that would lessen the impact of Hartford Roman Catholic
Diocesan Corp. on Illinois jurisprudence. However, the court there also
cited to New York’s interpretation of the revival of personal causes of
action, which relies more heavily on public policy concerns and commonsense interpretations of justice.198
Specifically, New York Courts have held that the state legislature may
revive a cause of action that would otherwise have expired if it is
reasonably determined that “the circumstances are exceptional and are
such as to satisfy the court that serious injustice would result to plaintiffs
not guilty of any fault if the intention of the [l]egislature were not
effectuated.”199 This rule seems more palatable to Illinois courts. It
provides an exception to the general rule that a statute of limitation or
repose would provide for an affirmative defense, but only in instances

194. See id. at 508 (citing Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 222 (1822)) (recognizing that
Connecticut case law affords some protection to defendants alleging a defense in an expired statute
of limitation, but finding that its case law “nevertheless embraces the constitutional permissibility
of ‘manifestly just’ retroactive legislation affecting legal rights and obligations”).
195. See id. at 514–16 (quoting Marci A. Hamilton, The Time Has Come for a Restatement of
Child Sex Abuse, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 397, 404 (2014)) (discussing public policy considerations and
recognizing various psychological research studies that generally assert “a child who seemed
unharmed by childhood abuse can develop crippling symptoms years later”).
196. Id. at 504 (quoting Roberts v. Canton, 619 A.2d 844, 849 (Conn. 1993)).
197. See id. (quoting Roberts, 619 A.2d at 849) (agreeing with plaintiff’s emphasis on the
“legitimate legislative purpose . . . to afford a plaintiff sufficient time to recall and come to terms
with traumatic childhood events before he or she must take action” even if it would surprise a
defendant, which the court notes was “an express purpose of the statute.”); see also Roberts, 619
A.2d at 849 n.8 (quoting Sen. Anthony Avallone’s testimony before the Judiciary Committee,
couching much of the rationale in a concern for child-victims’ memory repression).
198. See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 512–13 (citing
Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620 (1950)) (explaining the New York court’s approach
of reviving a cause of action when serious injury would otherwise result to plaintiffs).
199. Gallewski, 93 N.E.2d at 624.
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that public policy concerns render that rule unjust or arbitrary.200 It would
provide a stronger exception than the discovery rule,201 an exception
founded in similar logic, which bars victims from overcoming the statute
of repose.202 There are several instances of Illinois courts recognizing that
survivors of childhood sexual abuse were victim to serious injustice,203
and it cannot be reasonably argued that children could share in the fault
of such a heinous act. At bottom, Illinois should at least reconsider and
give weight to the underlying public policy considerations that justify
such an exception for the sake of justice to victims. The most appropriate
method of reconsidering these concerns would be through the courtprovided balancing test set forth by Landgraf and endorsed by
Commonwealth Edison.204
The outcome of this New York procedure is just such justice. The
Child Victims Act went through the New York legislature successfully,
invoking the one-year look-back window that retroactively opens the
courts to victims.205 The more than four hundred lawsuits filed on
opening day demonstrate the efficacy of the rule in action206—so much
200. Again, the authors do not contest the validity of the general assertion that there is a per se
rule against retroactive implication. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272
(1994) (“Because it accords with widely held intuitions about how statutes ordinarily operate, a
presumption against retroactivity will generally coincide with legislative and public expectations.”
(emphasis added)).
201. See supra Section II.B (describing the rule and its specific pleading requirements).
202. See Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43, 70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (citing
Goodman v. Harbor Mkt., Ltd., 663 N.E.2d 13, 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)) (“Statutes of repose do not
incorporate the discovery rule and generally terminate claims regardless of a plaintiff’s lack of
knowledge of his or her cause of action.”).
203. See, e.g., M.E.H. v. L.H., 685 N.E.2d 335, 340 (Ill. 1997) (“Although we are not
unsympathetic to plaintiffs’ position, it fails to take into account that there are other interests at
stake here.”). In some instances, the court seems to go so far as to deflect blame for an adverse
judgment to plaintiffs to demonstrate some level of sympathy to victims on record. See, e.g.,
Diocese of Dall. II, 917 N.E.2d 475, 487 (Ill. 2009) (“Defendants in this case have elected to invoke
the defense, and they alone are responsible for that decision and its impact on plaintiff’s ability to
seek relief through the courts. Our function, as a court of review, is simply to insure that the law is
applied correctly.”). The authors harbor no resentment towards the courts for applying what they
believe to be sound principles of legal judgment—we simply disagree with the courts’ outcomes.
204. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will Cty. Collector, 749 N.E.2d 964, 976 (Ill. 2001)
(quoting In re Marriage of Semmler, 481 N.E.2d 716, (Ill. 1985)) (“In assessing whether the
application of a new statutory amendment to an existing controversy violates due process, the
question is not simply whether the rights allegedly impaired are [labeled] vested or non-vested.”
(alterations in original)); see also id. (quoting Moore v. Jackson Park Hosp., 447 N.E.2d 408 (Ill.
1983) (Ryan, C.J., specially concurring)) (“The determination of whether the application of the
statute unreasonably infringes upon the rights of those to whom it applies involves a balancing and
discrimination between reasons for and against application of the statute to the class of
individuals.”).
205. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g (McKinney 2019).
206. See Priscilla DeGregory et al., Child Victims Act Brings ‘Hope’ to Formerly Abused Kids:
Lawyer, N.Y. POST (Aug. 14, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/08/14/hundreds-of-lawsuits-filed-
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so that the legislature recently moved to expand the window by an
additional year.207 If the intended effect of the legislature is truly to open
the courts to victims of childhood sexual abuse, such a rule moves
towards effectuating that intent.
V. PROPOSAL AND IMPACT
The legislature should draft and pass a new bill that seeks to amend
section 5/13-202.2 and insert a finite window that would allow expired
claims arising out of childhood sexual abuse to proceed under the current
infinite statute of limitations. Upon likely challenge and appeal by
relevant litigants, the Illinois Supreme Court should reevaluate its
determination that such defendants have a vested right to the defense of
expired statutes of limitations and repose through application of
Landgraf. Between a properly executed Landgraf test and considerations
of legislative intent, public policy, and common principles of justice, the
court should find that the retroactive window in section 5/13-202.2 is
constitutional under the Illinois Due Process Clause.208
A. The Legislature
Historical treatment of this issue by the Illinois General Assembly
intimates that such a proposal is not out of the question. It is undeniable
that the trend in amendments to section 5/13-202.2 weigh decisively in
favor of plaintiffs since 1994. The statute of repose that went effective in
1991 lasted only three years before it was totally repealed.209 Its short life
strongly indicates that it was viewed nearly immediately as a mistake,
something that the courts have recognized in their analyses of this statute

on-first-day-child-victims-act-takes-effect/ [https://perma.cc/6SJY-6NPL]; see also Steve Orr,
Hundreds of Child Sex Abuse Claims Filed on First Day of New York’s Child Victims Act, USA
TODAY (Aug. 14, 2019) https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/08/14/new-yorkchild-victims-act-lawsuits/2007257001/ [https://perma.cc/V7G9-HDFT] (asserting that 385 of the
400-plus cases were filed by noon).
207. New York is not the only state that rests between acceptance and rejection of Campbell.
Wisconsin recognizes that there is a vested right in the lapse of statutes, but nevertheless has utilized
the rational basis standard to analyze the constitutionality of a revival statute by balancing (1)
private interests that are overturned by retroactivity; and (2) the public interest served by
retroactivity. See Soc’y Ins. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 786 N.W.2d 385, 396 (Wis. 2010)
(quoting Matthies v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 628 N.W.2d 842, 855 (Wis. 2001)) (“Whether there
exists a rational basis involves weighing the public interest served by retroactively applying the
statute against the private interest that retroactive application of the statute would affect.”).
208. The authors take no opinion as to what, if any, prior cases need to be overturned. Only to
the extent that this proposed course of action is wholly inconsistent with previous decisions should
any be expressly overruled—a decision soundly and rightly in the Illinois Supreme Court’s
discretion.
209. See P.A. 88-127, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 1994) (eliminating the statute of repose).
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moving forward.210 This plaintiff-friendly trend is only strengthened
when examining the legislature’s treatment of the statute of limitations,
which raised from two, to ten, and then to twenty years before it too was
done away with in 2014.211
Such an amendment would likely gain public support for obvious
reasons. It would implicate those guilty, to any degree, of child sexual
abuse and ensure that their participation would be on public record.212 At
the same time, it would ensure that only those who want to pursue their
claims may do so, leaving prosecutorial discretion outside the bounds of
consideration. The unique nature of civil remedies in this context cannot
be understated as it allows plaintiffs to control entirely the course of
action in handling a most-personal issue.
Aside from general notions of plaintiff-friendly factors, the legislature
has attempted to apply this statute retroactively in the past.213 This exact
intent has been at the heart of several appeals to the various appellate
districts and the supreme court.214 As discussed at length, the back-andforth history of Illinois courts’ treatment of retroactive application gave
the legislature reason to be uncertain in how its retroactive proposals
would be received. Ultimately this attempt to apply the amendment
retroactively was received poorly and rejected. The sting of this rejection
led sponsors of the bill to outwardly deny the suggestion that the newly
eliminated statute of limitations could affect expired claims based on Doe
v. Diocese of Dallas II.215 Based on the recent amendments in California,
New Jersey, and New York—all of which employ a retroactive look-back

210. See, e.g., Diocese of Dall. I, 885 N.E.2d 376, 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (citing
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will Cty. Collector, 749 N.E.2d 964, 975 (Ill. 2001)) (“That desire
to fix the problems inherent in a previous version of a statute weighs in favor of a retroactive
application.”).
211. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (detailing the various amendments to section
5/13-202.2).
212. See supra note 70 (discussing that the passage of the Child Victims Act would help the
public identify hidden child predators through the civil discovery process).
213. Even the Illinois Supreme Court in Diocese of Dallas recognized that the clear legislative
intent of the statute was for it to be applied retroactively, though the court ultimately ruled against
that intent. See generally Diocese of Dall. II, 917 N.E.2d 475 (Ill. 2009).
214. See, e.g., Diocese of Dall. II, 917 N.E.2d 475 (Ill. 2009) (discussing the legislative intent
of the statute); M.E.H. v. L.H., 685 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. 1997) (finding retroactive intent but declining
to apply it); Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield in Ill., 857 N.E.2d 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)
(discussing, though not independently analyzing, this argument lodged by the plaintiff and instead
relying on M.E.H. to reject the contention).
215. See Ill. S. Tran., 2013 Reg. Sess. No. 41 (Apr. 25, 2013) (“Sen. Harmon: So my first
question is this: Is the intent of this bill to circumvent the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in Doe
against Diocese, regarding revival of time-barred cases? . . . Sen. Link: No. this bill does not disrupt
the Illinois Supreme Court ruling in Doe versus Diocese . . . .”).
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window216—the Illinois General Assembly could stomach a direct
challenge to this precedent on such a specific and limited scale.
B. The Courts
Were the legislature to issue such a pointed amendment, it would be
likely that the court would see it as a direct challenge to the idea that the
sex abuse limitations statute creates a vested right in an affirmative
defense. Hopefully, this understanding would spark thorough
reconsideration.
The fact that the court read into the Landgraf test that the Statute on
Statutes would forbid progressing to the second-step of the analysis could
be circumvented by sufficient legislative intent. It is questionable that the
presumption of legislative intent in the general savings clause of the
Statute on Statutes applies to all statutes to void even plainly stated
legislative intent,217 but the existence of this presumption should not
mean that the underpinnings of the latter half of the Landgraf analysis is
rendered useless.218 Because the first step of Landgraf requires that clear
legislative intent be effectuated absent constitutional violation, and
because the second step provides a format to analyze what constitutes a
vested right, this analysis should apply to determine whether an
individual statute creates a vested right or not.219 Such a narrowlytailored retroactive look-back window would not entirely uproot the idea
that a statute of limitations’ expiration provides a vested right to an
affirmative defense—it would only apply to this specific statute based on
overwhelming concerns founded in public policy and common principles
of justice.220 Additionally, the structure of the retroactive look-back
window that would be unique to this proposed legislative amendment

216. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g (McKinney 2019) (employing a one-year window that began
six months after the act’s effective date); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2a (2019) (employing
a two-year window upon the act’s effective date); A.B. 218. 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 861
(employing a three-year window upon the act’s effective date).
217. See generally Caveney v. Bower, 797 N.E.2d 596 (Ill. 2003) (invalidating the second step
of Landgraf based on the Statute on Statutes).
218. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 317–20 (2001) (engaging in a full Landgraf analysis
ignoring and despite the existence of a “federal general savings statute” 1 U.S.C. § 109 (2000));
see also Caveney, 797 N.E.2d at 607 (Freeman, J., specially concurring) (arguing, through partial
reliance on St. Cyr, that a general savings clause to be applied in such a broad manner is
inappropriate and inconsistent with the Illinois Supreme Court’s treatment of the Landgraf
analysis).
219. The application of this balancing analysis in Diocese of Dallas provides an example of this
idea. See generally Diocese of Dall. I, 885 N.E.2d 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
220. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing why depriving a vested right in this
specific statute of limitation’s expiration should not deprive the foundation of vested rights in other
statutes of limitation that are created in furtherance of difference objectives).
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would assist in underlining that this statute really is an exception to the
rule.
Upon engaging in the actual analysis of this statute which (1) contains
no statute of limitations moving forward and (2) contains a retroactive
look-back window, the question of whether the right to an affirmative
defense is vested in the plaintiff’s expired claims under previous versions
of the statute would be decisively weaker. The courts, as well as the
legislature,221 have recognized on numerous occasions that repressed
memory of childhood sexual abuse is a unique consideration.222 While
the discovery rule partially covers those with specifically diagnosed
mental conditions that repress such memories, it absolutely fails to cover
those that were barred by the long-extinct statute of repose.223 The
arbitrary nature of this reality is compounded by the fact that there is no
limit of any kind on recent claims regardless of the plaintiff’s delay in
filing.224 The legislature has already actively ignored the reasons that
normally justify statutes of limitations and repose—judicial economy and
undue burden or surprise to defendants—and so arguments founded in
this rationale could hardly defend those seeking to close the retroactive
look-back window. Even those without mental health conditions
contributing to memory repression have no limits to when they file their
claims moving forward, so why should older plaintiffs suffer from such
a limitation? No defendant could reasonably rely on such a defense
anyway, as the intricacies of mental health bar prediction from defendants
as to whether their victims would repress memory. They would be no
more burdened or surprised by their victim’s delayed lawsuit than they
would be if the victim filed a successful suit pursuant to the discovery
rule.
To avoid arbitrary application of the otherwise operational and
constitutional statute, to further public policy concerns, and to uphold
common sense principles of fairness and justice, the Illinois Supreme
Court should uphold such a statute that would allow victims of childhood
221. Aside from the civil statute, the legislature has used similar rationale in support of the
more-recently expanded statute of limitations for criminal prosecution of childhood sexual abuse.
See Ill. H.R. Tran. 2017 Reg. Sess. No. 49 (“[Representative] Mussman: . . . This will allow our
victims more access to the Criminal Justice System and recognition of the fact that most child
victims are bused by people they know and trust and are vulnerable to coercion, intimidation and
guilt tactics that reduce the likelihood that they would report in a timely manner.”).
222. See Clay v. Kuhl, 696 N.E.2d 1245, 1249−52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (reconsidering its
application of the sudden traumatic event exception in cases where the victim can successfully
plead repressed memory).
223. See Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43, 70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (quoting
Goodman v. Harbor Mkt., Ltd., 663 N.E.2d 13, 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)) (“Statutes of repose do not
incorporate the discovery rule and generally terminate claims regardless of a plaintiff’s lack of
knowledge of his or her cause of action.”).
224. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202.2(f) (2019).
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sexual abuse whose claims have expired to file suit under a limited
retroactive look-back window.
C. Impact
In general, the impact would be wholly positive. As former Attorney
General Lisa Madigan’s report stated, hundreds of cases of childhood
sexual abuse have gone unreported and unaddressed.225 That report came
out years following the statute of limitation’s deletion. Clearly, more can
be done, and a retroactive window would encourage efforts towards that
end.
For the sake of example, New York demonstrates a positive outcome
in applying this window. New York applied its retroactivity window in a
realistic manner and yielded an overall efficient outcome in
implementing it. Upon signing the bill into law the window was delayed
by six months.226 This delay served plaintiffs in that it allowed them time
to consider their options, build a case, and file in a timely manner, but it
also offered the courts a reprieve to prepare for the upcoming rush of
litigation. On the litigant’s side of things, everything ran relatively
smoothly. On opening day, over four hundred suits were filed, followed
up by hundreds more in the upcoming months.227
Predictably, however, the courts were the ones burdened by this
window, but not to such an extreme as to render it ineffective or
inappropriate. To lessen the upcoming burden, the state courts issued a
memorandum on how it would go about handling the increased caseloads,
as well as inviting comment on procedure that might assist in the
transition.228 The window proved successful and has been considered for
an additional year to allow for the filing of valid cases to continue on
unimpeded.229 The legislature also catered to this concern by providing

225. See generally AG PRELIMINARY FINDINGS, supra note 1.
226. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g (McKinney 2019).
227. See Joseph Spector, Child Victims Act in New York: The Window to Sue Expires in 2020.
Why
it
May
Get
Extended,
DEMOCRAT
&
CHRON.
(Jan.
3,
2020),
https://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/politics/albany/2020/01/03/child-victims-actnew-york-why-one-year-window-sue-may-get-extended/2805834001/
[https://perma.cc/4AR92RWD] (alleging approximately 1300 lawsuits were filed in the opening year).
228. See, e.g., Memorandum from John W. McConnell on behalf of NY State Unified Court
System, Request for Public Comment on Proposed Rules to Facilitate the Prompt Disposition of
Matters Revived Under the Child Victims Act of 2019, http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/
files/document/files/2019-05/RPC-ChildVictimsActRules%205-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/UDN33G8K] (providing opportunity to comment on the proposed rules).
229. Cayla Harris, Bill Would Give Survivors Another Year to File Child Victims Act Claims,
TIMES UNION (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Bill-would-give-survivorsanother-year-to-file-14951408.php [https://perma.cc/A9TX-LD2B] (reporting that the original
sponsor of the Child Victims Act is proposing to extend the retroactivity window by at least one
year).
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for increased training for a set of forty-five judges to take on these
claims.230 Ultimately, judicial economy is a back-seat concern to
furthering the legislation’s overall purpose, but it is still a consideration
that can be catered to in a meaningful way.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Illinois General Assembly would further commonsense understandings of justice should it apply a retroactivity window for
victims of childhood sexual abuse to file suit on claims that would
otherwise have expired. In tandem, courts should reconsider and
disregard, on a narrow and individually tailored basis, their holdings that
amendments to the childhood sexual abuse statutes of limitations and
repose that prevent, at least, hundreds of plaintiffs from seeking
remuneration against those responsible for their injuries. This most
sensitive of issues is one best left to the victims to determine how to seek
justice. The legislature and courts have echoed this general
understanding. Rather than impede these efforts, our government should
encourage them through even-handed treatment of all who suffered from
the terrible consequences of others’ unforgiveable acts.

230. See S.B. 2440, 242d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); Julie Zauzmer & Sarah Pulliam Bailey,
New York Braces for a Flood of Lawsuits, as One-Year Window Opens for Child Sexual Abuse
Victims to Bring Cases, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
religion/2019/08/14/new-york-braces-flood-lawsuits-one-year-window-opens-child-sex-abusevictims-bring-cases/ [https://perma.cc/ZWG7-LAEE].

